Vol. 1 No. 5 July, 2016

Emerging Dimensions of the Geopolitics of the Horn of Africa

ijsac — Sat, 16 Jul 2016 06:03:35 +0000

Emerging Dimensions of the Geopolitics of the Horn of Africa ijsac Sat, 07/16/2016 - 12:03

Edward Waithaka and Patrick Maluki

Abstract

This paper gives an overview of the emerging dimensions of the geopolitics of the Horn of African States and interests surrounding Ilemi triangle. It will focus on: power, politics, policy, space, place, territory, and embraces an innumerable multitude of interactions within and around the states that occupy the Horn of Africa. It also focuses on the varied interest that states have to the resource rich Ilemi triangle. International conflict will always exist. In such conflict bargaining, states develop capabilities that give them leverage to obtain more favorable outcomes than they could obtain without such leverage. Whether fair or unfair, the ultimate outcome of the bargaining process is a settlement of the particular conflict.^{^[1]} This paper focuses on each individual state and how they execute their foreign policies in relation to the triangle.

Introduction

Geopolitics concerns power struggles over territories for the purpose of political control over space. In other words, geopolitics is the practice and ability of a state to control and compete for a territory.^{^[2]} Thus the geopolitics of Horn of Africa entails power, politics, policy, space, place, and interests that states embrace as they interact in the Horn of Africa^{^[3]}. Horn of Africa provides a perfect instance of conflict ridden area. There is no consensus as to how many countries make the horn of Africa but for purpose of this study focus will be five countries namely; Ethiopia, Sudan, south Sudan, Somalia and Kenya. The geopolitics of the Horn of Africa can well be understood by analyzing each individual state’s potential power in relation to their size, economy, population, power, prestige, potential wealth, global positioning, strategic importance and international influence.

The case of the Ilemi Triangle has been complicated by history and the states that claim the triangle exhibit rational politics that make it interesting and of great concern to the security and international relations of the Horn of Africa. An analysis of the foreign policies of the states in the region that occupy the Horn will shed light on how the triangle will be the focus of the international politics in regards to the resource potential that the triangle possess. Geopolitics being the ability of the state to control a territory and given the territory in question has been contested over years, it is of great concern that overview of the history that has complicated ownership of the triangle be revisited.

The politics of Ilemi triangle

Ilemi triangle is variously claimed by Kenya, Ethiopia and South Sudan. This explains why until now the triangle has been unwanted hence not economically developed by any regional government.^{^[4]} Ilemi triangle is on the fringe of South Sudan, which is rich in unexplored oil. Nevertheless no explorations have been made in the contested territory partly due to insecurity from the 30 year civil war in South Sudan and partly due to hands-off altitude by each regional government. It lacks in infrastructure or modern facilities and is so insulated that its only reminder of the outside world is a Kenyan frontier post.^{^[5]}

The geopolitical prominence of the Horn of Africa, where Ilemi lies makes it a pivotal factor in the global balance of power. The politics of Ilemi triangle dates back the period when Africa was being partitioned by colonial powers. Political developments in Ethiopia by a large extent explain the politics surrounding Ilemi triangle since it was not colonized and there was no urgency for delimitation of Kenya-Sudan – Ethiopia border, which was under British emperor. Emperor Menelik II succeeded Tewodros II of Ethiopia who died at the critical time when both British and Germany were mapping out their territories in Africa. Ethiopia’s unification was hampered by imperial interest and in 1891 Emperor Menelik II sent circulars to the imperial powers outlining the extent of his empire and in 1896 he resumed expansion of Ethiopia southwards in order to check the northward expansion of British sphere of influence.^{^[6]} Menelik with better weapons and sound policy militarily conquered and consolidated remote areas just as the British did. The territory claimed by Menelik included Lake Turkana which he called the Samburu Sea. He proposed his southern boundary with the British to run from the southern end of Lake Turkana due east to the Indian Ocean. Emperor Menelik based his territorial claim on slave raiding. He also established administrative centers and garrisons to fully consolidate the territory. Britain disagreed with Menelik’s proposal and insisted on running the Ethiopia-Kenya boundary.^{^[7]} Britain delineated its territories to halt other Europeans’ territorial ambitions and more specifically to curtail Emperor Menelik’s claim to land Britain considered within its sphere of influence. Mr. Archibald Butter and Captain Philip Maud surveyed Ethiopia’s border with British East Africa in 1902-3 and marked the ‘Maud line’ which was recognized in 1907 as the de facto Kenya-Ethiopian border^{^[8]}.

Emperor Menelik continued with slave raiding which depopulated Kenya and Sudan and this necessitated the British to conduct military expeditions to contain such depopulation and secure its territory, a move that was welcome to both Kenya and Sudan. Death of Menelik II dealt a big blow to the political development of Ethiopia and his appointed grandson Lij Iyasu, age 11, to succeed him did not deliver any meaningful achievement to the Amharic nation.^{^[9]}His death slowed down the resolution of the border conflict and Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia did not hold any meaningful discussion to rectify the border issue until the crowning of Emperor Haile Selassie.

The need to redefine the borders of British territories in Africa raised several issues that were core to future border rectification between Kenya, Uganda, and Sudan in Ilemi. This led to the formation of the Uganda-Sudan Boundary Commission which was formed in 1914. The central issues included the determination of Turkana grazing grounds while Sudan was to gain access to Lake Turkana through a lozenge of land known as the Ilemi Appendix and its eastern border was to curve outwards to Ethiopia to bring the whole Kuku ethnic community into Sudan.^{^[10]}

Uganda also had territorial claims and wanted to expand northwards and bring the Sudanese Acholi to Uganda. The labor patrol of 1918 was commissioned to undertake study on the issues that each country had. The objectives of the patrol included; The punishment and disarmament, in respect of fire-arms, of the Donyiro, Marille, and Turkana tribes, and of any other native tribes resident in the military area who have shown hostility to the Government and the expulsion of the Abyssinians from the East Africa and Uganda Protectorates west of Lake Rudolf.^{^[11]}

After the Labor patrol the British were reluctant to invest in administration of troops due to logistical constraints and causality cost in the event of Ethiopia’s military expeditions. In 1902 the Uganda Order in Council of 1902 transferred some parts inhabited by the Turkana’s from Uganda to Kenya. Uganda's Eastern Province by then known as Rudolf Province was transferred to British East African Protectorate in (Kenya) thereby reducing Uganda to 2/3 of its size.^{^[12]} The parts transferred to Kenya included the lands inhabited by the Turkana who had to move southwards to Kenya’s hinterland so as to benefit from British protection. By so doing they lost their fertile pastures in Ilemi to the Inyangatom and the Dassanech. Britain suggested that Ilemi should be excised from Sudan and incorporated into Uganda, or, the portion of Uganda’s former Rudolph Province containing the triangle be ceded to southern Sudan, Consequently the British established their administration among the Turkana’s. After 1926, the Kenyan colonial authorities established an administrative boundary that did not coincide with the Anglo-Ethiopian treaty of 1907 as a measure of accommodating Turkana’s ancestral grazing area within Kenya and offering the Turkana’s protection against Ethiopia’s cattle rustlers and Sudanese militia. The boundaries created by the Kenyan administration raised a number of issues. First, a bigger portion of the Turkana’s dry weather pastures lay to the North of the 1914 line; this was the portion of Ilemi not falling under Kenyan administration.^{^[13]} Second, a number of pastoral communities were put under the authority of Emperor of Ethiopia who initially was under British dominion and finally most Sudanese and Ethiopian rustlers made use of the areas in Sudan far north of the Anglo-Ethiopian boundary to raid and stole livestock from their unprotected neighbors.

The British disarmed the Turkana community and the military balance between them and their Inyangatom and Dassanech neighbors was disrupted who frequently raided and stole their livestock with minimal opposition and in full view of the British authorities. The military imbalance increased the cattle rustling raids and insecurity of the region.1929 Britain realized that its success in policing Kenya’s northern frontier depended on Ethiopia’s capability to do the same across the common border and for this reason it recommended to other European governments to lift the arms embargo previously imposed on Ethiopia.^{^[14]}

Starting from 1931 the British was determined to establish law and order in the Ilemi triangle and it mandated Sudan to contribute £10,000 annually toward the expenses of administering the territory^{^[15]}.The administration of the territory was not a mean feat as the region required roads and other infrastructure to aid in supplies and therefore for effective delivery of services. Kenya demanded an additional sum of £5,000 annually for the construction of roads and administrative infrastructure in Ilemi.^{^[16]} Sudan rejected the proposal and instead attempted to establish the administrative center itself where it was confronted by a number of challenges that made it impossible as it required transporting supplies to the region along Nile River through Sudan’s southern Mongalla province and across a hostile country that had no roads.

In 1931 the administrators of Mongalla (Sudan) and Turkana (Kenya) agreed that the northern limits of Turkana pastures were within the area defined by the Red Line. Sudan accepted that both the Dassanech and the Inyangatom should share grazing lands during the dry spell periods and as a result the Red line was extended northwards into what came to be known as Green line.^{^[17]} This extension was to allow the Turkana to gain access to the pastures and water holes which they were to share with the Dassanech and Inyangatom. Ethiopia hastily constructed an administrative center at Namuruputh to interpret that it had formally annexed the areas given to Dassanech and the Inyangatom as grazing lands.

Italians invasion of Ethiopia in 1936 compelled the British to re-align its East Africa territory boundaries to contain Italians imperialism in the region. After occupying Ethiopia in 1936, Italians claimed Ilemi triangle on the basis that the Ethiopian Dassanech were also indigenous residents of the triangle. As a result the 1902 Maud Line (also 1907 boundary) was hurriedly confirmed as the Kenya-Ethiopia border to protect British interests from Italian territorial ambitions. British suggested to Ethiopia to cede the Baro Salient to Sudan in exchange for an area southeast of Ilemi, which Sudan had never administered. In Britain's quid pro quo proposal, Sudan would take 11,000 square miles of the Baro Salient from Ethiopia in exchange for 6,000 square miles of eastern Ilemi that would be given to Ethiopia.^{^[18]} Kenya was assured that the arrangement would not infringe on Turkana’s grazing rights with Sudan promising to rectify the Kenya-Sudan boundary so as to reduce the avenues for attacking the Turkana’s by the rustlers from Ethiopia and Sudan.

In 1938 both Kenya and Sudan established a survey team which extended the Red line in northeast direction and established what is referred to as ‘Wakefield line’ or the ‘Provisional Administrative Boundary’. The Red Line now stretched the Ilemi eastwards to include more watering and protective terrain shared by all pastoral communities.^{^[19]} The Inyangatom and the Dassanech conducted a violent raid in 1939 in the UN administered areas of the Turkana and killed hundreds of unarmed women and children of Ilemi. Italians exonerated themselves from the blame indicating that they had no control over the Dassanech and the Inyangatom a move that necessitated revenge from the British who dropped bombs in a punitive raid conducted by the KAR (Kenya Africa Rifles) and the Royal Air Force. ^{^[20]}

The British foreign office established Blue Line West of Red Line which enlarged the Ilemi Triangle in 1944. Consequently both Ethiopia and Sudan commissioned a survey team to rectify their common boundary. The survey team failed to agree on the exact location of the line to avoid splitting of the Nuer and Anuak ethnic groups. Ethiopia had a number of suggestions that were to be included in the rectification of the common boundary. Ethiopia proposed that in exchange for the Baro salient the common boundary should include in Ethiopia the Inyangatom and Dassanech grazing grounds. Additionally Ethiopia proposed River Omo to remain in her territory so as to safeguard the fishing rights of the Ethiopian communities. Sudanese government established the Sudan patrol where they prohibited Kenyan and Ethiopian pastoralist from moving west of it giving up policing and development to the east of it. The Sudan patrol line was not to affect the sovereignty of both Sudan and Kenya and Kenya continued to be paid by Sudan to patrol this line.^{^[21]}

In August 1967, President Jomo Kenyatta tried to win the sympathy of Britain on the determination of the Kenya-Sudan boundary by proposing the recognition of the Red Line as the international Kenya-Sudan boundary. This arrangement was to make the 1914 line which placed the whole of Ilemi in Sudan as null and void. In the 1990s, the current Ethiopian government armed the Dassanech with new Kalashnikov automatics in recognition of their vulnerability from the Kenyan Turkana and Sudanese cattle thieves. The arming of the Dassanech resulted to the Koikai massacre that led to death of hundreds of Borans. After the death of Jomo Kenyatta in 1978 president Daniel Arap Moi assumed power and politics of Ilemi took another dimension. President Moi’s government entered a covert deal with the government of Sudan, which ceded Ilemi to Kenya in exchange for halting military support for the SPLA through the Turkana ethnic community. Moi’s government continued to supply arms to Turkanas an indication that led to speculation that Kenya claims the area. Many Kenyan maps have marked the Red line as the official boundary of Kenya, rather than a dotted boundary which it had previously. Most of Kenyans maps depict the 1950 patrol line as the boundary.^{^[22]} Kenya continues to man the territory.

Contested Territoriality/Geopolitics and States Interest

Kenya came to occupy the Ilemi Triangle by default through a covert deal signed by the retired president Daniel T, Moi and the leader of the SPLA Dr, John Garang. Kenya was mandated to offer both military and logistical support to the south Sudanese army during the 20 year civil war in exchange for the triangle. Prior to that, Khartoum government had given Kenya permission to send military units across the border in order to protect the Turkana against the Dassanech who raided and stole their livestock.^{^[23]} In 1924 officials representing the three countries of Kenya, Uganda and Sudan met at Kitgum in Uganda to discuss the delimitation of Ilemi triangle which had become a territorial issue. The representatives of Uganda and Kenya persuaded those from the Sudan to redraw the boundary to include the northern limits of the Turkana grazing grounds across the 1914 Line ceding the territory either to Uganda or Kenya that would enable them to provide protection for the Turkana.

In 1926, the Rudolf Province of Uganda was transferred to the Kenya Colony. The Sudan agreed that it would cede 1,167 square miles of Ilemi to Kenya and an additional 90 square miles above the old Red Line. Units of the King’s African Rifles (KAR) moved into the triangle and by 1947 Kenya had seven police posts in the territory, 200 police, and another 200 armed Turkana tribal police operating in Ilemi. ^{^[24]} Units of the King’s African Rifles (KAR) thereafter moved north of the 1914 Line in the dry season and successfully protected the Turkana at a cost of some £30,000 annually. Official documents in both Kenya and Sudan have depicted and delineated the Ilemi Triangle by a dotted line clearly marked “provisional/administrative boundary” making the 1914 line to disappear in both countries maps especially Kenya’s maps and replaced by a solid continuous line conferring ownership to Kenya. As much as time as passed the maps and Atlases in Kenya show the administrative Red Line, not the 1914 Line, as the international boundary. Today Ilemi is solely controlled and administered by Kenya government as its territory and with the current discovery of natural resources of Oil and water Ilemi remains Kenya’s territory.

Kenya is a low income economy with per capita GDP of less than $1005 per annum. It is mainly an agricultural based economy and a net importer and petroleum based products account for 22% of total import bill.^{^[25]}According to the World Bank, Kenya’s economy grew by 5.7 per cent in 2015 and this economic growth is set to be catalyzed by the discovery of commercially viable oil deposits in Turkana which lies squarely in Ilemi triangle. Kenya’s oil discovery in 2012 has triggered a huge interest from the private sector to further explore the country’s geological basins. Having recently appeared on the energy radar, Kenya and the entire East Africa region has quickly become a hot spot for commercially viable oil and gas discoveries.^{^[26]} UK Tullow Oil which is spearheading the exploration announced the discovery of approximately one billion barrels of oil from oil wells in Amosing-1 and Ewoi-1 exploration wells in block 10bb onshore Northern Kenya. The latest findings and the recently reported discoveries at Ekales-1 and Agete-1, puts the total estimate of discovered resources in Kenya to over 600 million barrels in Turkana County, located in the country's arid northern region bordering Uganda and South Sudan, both of which have commercial oil deposits.^{^[27]}

Kenya belongs to a number of regional inter-governmental organizations which are instrumental in maintenance of peace and security in the region. They have been critical in conflict resolution and mediation between warring parties in the region. The Intergovernmental Authority and Development (IGAD) which is a fundamental organization in peace and stability in great lakes region has been in the forefront in stabilizing the war-torn Sudan. The Kenya-led IGAD Process successfully mediated between the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M). In this context the Kenya-led IGAD process was an institutional setup that was legitimately empowered to pursue peace in Sudan and ensure security of the region.^{^[28]}The unfolding political events in the Greater Horn of Africa region enabled the Kenya-led IGAD process to succeed in the mediation process between SPLA/M and the GOS a move that fosters confidence in the states that belong to the authority reducing conflict potentiality.

South Sudan Claim over Ilemi

The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 marked the birth of a new nation in the African continent. Sudan remained as the largest state in Africa until the secession of the south and creation of republic of South Sudan in 2011. South Sudan is a poor country which is still in the initial stages of state building. Despite the fact that it is endowed with abundant natural resources, essential for economic development, the state has not tapped the potential it possess largely due to protracted conflict and political skirmishes that have engulfed it since independence. Fifty one percent (51%) of South Sudanese are poor (55% in rural areas and 24%in urban areas). The economy is entirely agricultural with 80% of the population dependent on it directly and indirectly.^{^[29]} South Sudan depends largely on imports of goods, services, and capital from the north and trading partners like Kenya. The government of South Sudan derives nearly 98% of its budget revenues from oil which is exported through two pipelines that run to refineries and shipping facilities at Port Sudan on the Red Sea.^{^[30]} South Sudan’s total oil wealth is estimated at $38 billion and includes estimated future revenues from existing oil fields. The country has an estimated GDP of $13.80 billion and a population of 11.30 million.^{^[31]}

Regionally south Sudan has established diplomatic ties with regional powers such as Kenya to catalyze its infrastructural development as evidenced by the Lamu South Sudan Ethiopia Transport Corridor Project (LAPSSET) which aims at linking the three countries. The completion of the project will boost the volume of cross-border trade and it will provide an advance transportation network involving a standard gauge railway line to Juba, oil pipelines, oil refinery in Bargoni and the three Airports.^{^[32]} Additionally south Sudan has forged mutual cooperation with the republic of Ethiopia, though signing of memorandum of understanding (MoU), to construct pipeline running from Djibouti through Ethiopia to South Sudan which will facilitate transportation of crude oil to the international markets. Territoriality has been a contagious issue and a source of inter-state conflict with numerous sporadic killings being reported the contested oil-rich regions of Abyei, South Kordofan, Heglig and the recent claims over Ilemi triangle.

South Sudan inherited the claim for Ilemi triangle from Sudan, after it gained independence in 2011. Following the Anglo-Ethiopian agreement treaty of 1907 the entire Ilemi triangle was placed in the Sudanese side which bore the Sudanese patrol line. Subsequently in 1914, the Uganda- Sudan commission mandated with demarcation of Uganda- Sudan international boundary increased Sudanese access to Lake Turkana via Sanderson Gulf, a move that bred conflict and caused deaths occasioned by raids from Dassenech and Inyangatom from Ethiopia who were angered by such demarcation. ^{^[33]} Sudan refrained from administration of Ilemi Triangle since 1956. President Kenyatta of Kenya made a formal request to the British Foreign Office for the area to be seceded to Kenya and it was domesticated in the Kenyan maps which started showing the 1950 Sudan patrol line as the international boundary.^{^[34]} During the Sudanese civil war the leader of SPLA/M Dr john Garang entered into an agreement with the Kenyan government to cede Ilemi triangle to Kenya in exchange of both logistical and military support during the war. But upon the attainment of south Sudan independence in 2011 it revisited the claims on Ilemi pointing accusation on legality of Kenya’s ownership.

South Sudan wrote to the United Nations (UN) Security Council seeking interventions to reclaim some parts of Ilemi triangle that extends into the Kenyan territory. However, South Sudan’s Ambassador to Kenya later refuted this report claiming that it was a ‘malicious accusation. South Sudan fears that if Oil exploration in Kenya goes on, then they will stand to lose more Oil from the wells in Turkana which are on the Lower side of the oil-table than the wells in South Sudan.^{^[35]}They have therefore planned to create a conflict situation as a way for (South Sudan) to buy time to explore and drill more Oil on their side before Kenya drills theirs at Ngamia 1 and the various Blocks. The conflict situation will see to it that Kenya does not start drilling since they will be engaged in resolving this conflict first. Kenya remains to have the de facto control of Ilemi triangle and has continued to arm the Turkanas in the region to protect themselves against external threats posed by the nomadic raiders from the neighboring Ethiopia. South Sudan and Kenya are set to engage in a diplomatic row if the former takes it head on that the triangle in question lies in its territory and embarks on castigated measures to reclaim it. Territoriality is therefore a new dimension that is cropping up in the new republic and the new state seems to avoid the ugly traditional conflict resolution by filing suit papers with the international court of justice and the African Union claiming the now resource rich region.

Ethiopia’s Position Regarding Ilemi Triangle

The 1907 Anglo-Ethiopia treaty remains the relevant reference in regard to the position that Ethiopia has on Ilemi triangle. Emperor Menelik of Ethiopia with advanced weapons than his predecessor consolidated remote areas by military conquest and established garrisons and administrative posts just like the British imperialism and expansionist policies he claimed Lake Turkana which he called the Samburu Sea.^{^[36]}Emperor Menelik based his territorial claim on slave raiding into peripheral lands that Ethiopia did not always police and he proposed that his territory would run from Lake Turkana southeast up to Indian Ocean. After the First World War, Ethiopia armed the Nyangatom and Dassenach peoples primarily against the Turkana who were meant to be protected by the Blue Line. This increased level of fire arms translated to traditional raids into pitched battles and concomitantly raised death tolls.^{^[37]}

The Red Line sometimes referred to as the Glenday Line after the DC from Kenya, represented no change in the existing international boundary which had been established in 1914. It was an informal agreement defining the traditional grazing ground of the Turkana in the Ilemi Triangle. The Green Line of 1932 marking more territory further north of the Red Line was drawn to allow the Turkana access to pastures and waterholes where the Dassanetch and Nyangatom thought they had established rights.^{^[38]} The indulgence of Great Britain to the Italian conquest of Ethiopia in 1936 did not extend in the following year to Italian designs on Ilemi. Since the Ethiopian Dessanetch were indigenous residents of the Triangle, now subjects of the Italian empire, their rights to their ancestral home had presumably reverted to Italy which promptly established frontier posts along the Ethiopian frontier within the Sudan and Kenya.

Following a spate of attacks by the Dassanetch on the Turkana inflicting heavy casualties and loss of much livestock, the British Foreign Office drew yet another line, this one Blue that enlarged the Triangle but did not halt Ethiopian imperial ambitions supporting Dassanetch aggression in Ilemi. In 1964 officials from Kenya and Ethiopia met to discuss a readjustment of their boundary that resulted in an exchange of frontier posts, particularly the strategic Ethiopian post of Namuruputh to Kenya that restricted the free access of the Dassanetch to Lake Turkana.

Geopolitical Interests in the Triangle

Due to its permanent pasture as a result of waters from River Tarach and other smaller rivers pouring into the Lotagipi swamp and other closely linked smaller swamps, the Triangle was curved out to be a neutral zone by colonial authorities keen to minimize conflict among their African subjects. It was to be a safety net for pastoralist ethnic groups in the surrounding areas who were often engaged in violent conflicts over grazing rights and water during drought. This neutrality was granted after the Kitgum conference resolution of 1924. Thus the Toposa (Sudan), the Merile (or Dassanetch), the Nyangatom and the Tirma (Ethiopia) and Turkana (Kenya) were to graze and water their livestock under the supervision of the British authorities in Kenya.

Since the Triangle was the first to receive modern arms among African hands, it formed the cradle of rush for arms in the region, and experienced the earliest violent skirmishes. Even then they were on smaller scale not comparable to what has been occurring since the 1990s with modern globalization^{^[39]}. The historic analysis of the regional interests of major powers was centered on the notion of “spheres of influence” or “spheres of interest.” The term sphere of influence was not possibly used before 1880s when major powers signed a series of treaties delineating the boundaries of their colonial empires. This led to the adaptation of the term sphere of interest. Naturally the Sphere of interest policy directly conflicts with the doctrine of sovereignty. Many historians argue that such a policy was traditionally pursued by major powers.

Shatterbelt is the term for a relatively old notion concerning major power disagreements, tacit or open, over their influence in particular regions.^{^[40]}Cohen coined the term Shatterbelt and defined it as “a large strategically located region that is occupied by a number of conflicting states and is caught between the conflicting interests of adjoining Great Powers. Regional stakes or regional salience can in turn be interpreted as a reflection of tightness of relations between a major power and other states in the region. The notion of regional salience incorporates the idea of spheres of interest, indirectly those of shatter belts and foreign policy portfolios similarities. Regional salience variables refers to the less maniputable interests or stakes that forge a major power’s willingness to carry out its threat. The assumption here is that the more salient an area is for a major power, the more likely it is to become involved in a crisis arising in the area. Such argument can be extended to claim that if an area is highly significant for more than one major power, there would be a higher probability of a more serious conflict between regional powers.

Conflicts that are resource-based can be intractable. Some of the participants in the war may actually benefit from the unsettled conditions that can facilitate access to resources.^{^[41]} Perhaps the discovery of oil has seen the intensification of the Triangle conflict. On this view, an open inter-state conflict is prospective, however distant and this is an extra layer of conflict to ancient tribal rivalries and the pressure on basic natural resources. Border disputes often flare up after they become linked with important economic or social interests. Disputed territories may contain important natural resources, such as hydrocarbon, mineral reserves, or water sources; provide access to the sea or shared terrestrial resources, such as grazing areas; or be a strategic location. Such areas also may be subject to irredentist claims based on historical or cultural factors or demands for self-determination by their inhabitants.^{^[42]}

The disputes in the Horn of Africa region are bound to be explosive owing to the recent discovery of hydrocarbons in the vicinity. In most cases there are no clear agreements defining the boundaries nor clear legal frameworks and policies that govern the exploitation of the mineral wealth in cases where mineral deposits overlap boundaries. Sovereign boundaries have added some dynamism to the current mineral and energy rush in Eastern Africa as once peaceful neighbours scramble to maximize the mineral wealth deposits under their soil. Since oil and gas reservoirs know no boundaries and interpretations of where borders pass is at the discretion of current leaders, this are bound to raise tensions and could lead to cross border tensions and even conflict in the future.^{^[43]}

Foreign policy of Horn of African State

Foreign policy analysis focuses on interaction between one state and another be it direct multilateral or bilateral interaction. The key concept in foreign policy analysis is the national interest. Realist theories assert that international system is anarchic and the methods that states use to achieve national interest are self interesting, competitive and determined by their military power. Geographic position, material resources and demography are other important features that by a large extend dictate the pursuance of national interest.

To analyze the foreign policy of the Horn of African states, it is important to locate the geographical positioning of them and their strategic importance to world politics and economics. A politico-geographical approach has been used to analyze the foreign policy of the states that lie in the horn of Africa.^{^[44]} The region has the states that posses huge volumes of commercially exploitable petroleum, and its proximity to the Red sea which is major transit route makes the region very important to world politics. Kenya being one of the countries with claim to the Ilemi triangle has formulated in its foreign policy documents fundamental guiding principles that articulate the nation’s framework of achieving its international obligations and responsibilities. Key among them is the norm of peaceful coexistence with neighbors and other nations and the Respect for the equality, sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states.^{^[45]} These two principles are of great importance in analyzing the disputes that surround the Ilemi triangle and politics that have emerged among the state that lay claim to the triangle. Kenya’s claim to the Ilemi triangle is precarious since it started to administer the triangle during the Anglo-Egyptian rule of Sudan in the early nineteenth century. Sudan felt the triangle was useless hence did not develop it and therefore Kenya came on board to protect the Turkana who patrolled the area with their livestock, against raids from both Dassanech and Inyangatom.^{^[46]} In 1928, Khartoum permitted Kenya to patrol the area and Kenya sent military units of Kenya Africa rifles (KAR) who established administrative posts and put the area under Kenyan control, hence Ilemi triangle became a Kenyan territory by default.

Before president Moi came to power in 1978, the Maud Line named after Captain Philip Maud who delimited the boundary was recognized as the official international boundary between Kenya and Sudan. Kenyan maps showed the Ilemi triangle in dotted lines indicated provisional/ administrative boundary. After Moi came to power, he entered into a covert deal with Sudan that the made the dotted lines to disappear and be replaced by a continuous line indicating Kenya’s territory and its ownership.^{^[47]} Due to its current mineral possession, Kenya is bound to protect the Ilemi triangle as its territory as it is articulated in its foreign policy framework.

South Sudan is the youngest state in African continent and the 193^rd member of the UN. It gained independence after the success of a secession referendum that made it autonomous from the larger Sudan.^{^[48]}South Sudan lays a claim over Ilemi given its Toposa ethnic community roams the area in search for dry season pasture and water for their livestock. Their claim is further solidified by the discovery of oil deposits in the triangle. Being the youngest state in Africa and with no capacity to erect modern infrastructure or a military expedition, South Sudan has written to UN Security Council seeking international resolution to reclaim some parts of the triangle that extends to the Kenyan territory. This claim has been refuted as malicious by the ambassador of south Sudan to Kenya.^{^[49]} The fresh dispute over boundary has the potential to ignite interstate conflict that could destabilize the region given the heavy armament of the ethnic communities that reside in the region.

Just like her neighboring counterparts’ Ethiopia foreign policy is anchored on the pillar of economic development, democratization and good governance in a manner which takes into account the realities of Ethiopia, recognizing the vital principal of unity in diversity and the need for tolerance and accommodation.^{^[50]} Ethiopians claim on Ilemi triangle dates back the colonial days when imperialists demarcated international boundaries. Although the Dassanech of Ethiopia claims to the indigenous inhabitants of IIemi triangle, recently there have been sporadic conflicts between the Dassanech of Ethiopia and Turkanas of Kenya in the Ethiopian side of Karamoja cluster. Ethiopian Dassanech elders have held peace meetings with their Kenyan local elders to arbitrate on the ongoing conflict, while at the national level; the Kenya-Ethiopia Joint Border Commission has made efforts to de-escalate conflict through peaceful conflict resolution measures. These include preventing livestock raids, requiring the return of looted livestock and promoting peace-making between the hostile pastoral groups^{.^[51]}

Conclusion

The Ilemi Triangle is a piece of land joining Sudan, Kenya and Ethiopia, roughly measuring between 10,320 and 14,000sq kilometers and named after Anuak Chief Ilemi Akwon.^{^[52]} The Triangle is on the fringe of Southern Sudan and is home to five ethno-linguistic communities: the Turkana, Didinga, Toposa, Inyangatom and the Dassenench who are members of the larger ethno-cultural groups of these neighbouring countries but traditionally migrate to graze in the Triangle.^{^[53]} Precisely, the conflict surrounding the Ilemi triangle originated from the unclearity of the 1907 treaty signed between the Ethiopian government under Emperor Menelik and the British, which in fact became the Kenya-Ethiopian border, latter known as the 1914 Line.

The dispute surrounding Ilemi triangle dates back the year 1907 when Ethiopia and British signed a treaty which was adopted as the Kenyan-Ethiopian border. Political developments in the area have seen the area demarcated on different occasions with change in international boundary. The first being the Maud line which was surveyed by Captain Philip Maud, followed by the Red Line which Kenya perceived as its territorial boundary. Years on the British foreign office surveyed the Blue Line and gazette it as Turkana Grazing zone, a move that occasioned bloody massacre that resulted to deaths of Turkana’s and subsequent arms race which has created a security dilemma since then. Political developments in Sudan and south Sudan have reignited the old rivalries surrounding the ownership of the triangle with the latter claiming ownership and reporting Kenya to the Un Security Council, bringing fourth an international stalemate that needs an international arbitration. Recently the government of Kenya has announced the discovery of huge deposits of commercially viable oil deposits in Ngamia 1 in Turkana County through Tullow oil Company which is spearheading the drilling. Oil remains a precious resource in the triangle and a possible source for scramble by the infamous multinational corporations and even a possible casus belli (cause for war) in the area. Furthermore it is established that the area possess huge volumes of water which could be harnessed for irrigation and sustainable food security in the region which lie underground.

Many cooperative approaches to resource and border issues have been implemented by states on an agreed basis or as a result of dispute resolution assistance. What is often needed to resolve a territorial conflict, however, is to devise a “no lose” (non–zero sum) solution. Two cross-cutting distinctions between approaches to the resolution of border disputes form the basis for a matrix of approaches.^{^[54]} The first distinction is between binding and nonbinding procedures, with the former encompassing adjudication and arbitration and the latter including “good offices” or facilitation, for example utilizing the services of international leaders or eminent persons for conciliation and mediation. Mediation is distinguished from arbitration in that the resulting award must be accepted by the parties to the dispute. Nonbinding international means of resolving disputes, especially good offices and conciliation, allow for participation of the parties throughout the process of dispute resolution.

The second distinction is between approaches based primarily on law and those that permit the dispute resolution agent or panel to explore alternative approaches based on equity and natural justice. Depending on their terms of reference, arbitrators may be granted the power to make an award on this basis. Even the International Court of Justice, under its statute, may decide cases ex aequoet bono (i.e., based on equity and welfare) at the request of the parties. The most flexible approaches to the resolution of border disputes would combine elements of the nonbinding methods and equitable approaches to problem solving. This involves focusing on the practical elements of a territorial dispute, including the resource and other issues at stake, as well as how to address them in a way that is acceptable to the parties while avoiding, or at least deferring, legal issues related to sovereignty.

REFERENCES

Attilio,A.(2006).Geo-political explanation of conflict in the Horn of Africa. Addis Ababa .OSSREA.

Borders M. (2010) The Ilemi Triangle Sovereignty scape.

Collins, R. (2010). The Ilemi triangle. Santa Barbara: University of California.

Carter Center (2010) Approaches to Solving Territorial Conflicts: Sources, Situations, Scenarios, and Suggestions, One Copenhill, Atlanta, GA.

East Africa Energy (2012) Territorial disputes in Eastern Africa: The Mineral factor http://eafricaenergy.blogspot.com/2012/10/territorial-disputes-in-eastern-africa.html.Accessed on 20 April 2016.

Farah, T (1976). The problem of the Baro Salient. Sudan notes and records. LVII, 21-30.

Flint, C. (2011). Introduction to geopolitics. London :Rout ledge

Government of the Republic of South Sudan. (2011-2013). South Sudan Development Plan2011-2013. Juba: GoSS.

Goldstein S. J. (2004) International Relations, Fifth Edition, American University, Washington, D.C., Longman Publishers, New York.

Jones et. al.(2011). An Introduction to Political Geography: Space, Place and Politics.

Harold, M. (1975). The life and times of Menelik II Ethiopia 1844-1913. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Kinyanjui, B (2012). Kenya strikes oil in Turkana County but drilling could take years. Daily Nation

Martin, J. (2011). The Elemi triangle history. Nairobi: Opinion Kenya Ltd.

Mburu, N. (2003). Delimitation of elastic ilemi triangle. Pastrol conflict and official indifference in the horn of afrikca. frican Studies Quarterly, The Online Journal for African Studies, Spring

MoF. (2014). International relations: the principals of Ethiopia’s foreign policy. Addis Ababa: Government of Ethiopia.

Mwaura, P. (2005). Kenya’s claim over Sudan, Ethiopia border triangle precarious. Khartoum: Sudan tribute.

Olaka, H. ( 2010).Economic Implications of the Oil Discovery in Kenya. Nairobi: The Centre for Research on Financial Markets and Policy

Peter, M. (2005). Kenya’s claim over Sudan, Ethiopia border triangle precarious.Nairobi: Daily Nation.

Sam, K. (2012). The Ilemi triangle –a beacon of peace turned into a cause of conflict. Nairobi: word press.

Robert O. Collins O. R (2004). The Ilemi Triangle University of California Santa Barbara

Silberfein M. (2004) The Geopolitics of Conflict and Diamonds in Sierra Leone, Frank Cass and Company Limited.

Siefulaziz, M. (2004). Baseline study for the Ethiopian side of the karamoja cluster. Addis Ababa: National Inistitute Research for Ethiopia

Sophie,H. & Max, H. (2013). South Sudan.London: Bradt Travel Guides.

[1] Goldstein S. J. (2004) International Relations, Fifth Edition, American University, Washington, D.C., Longman Publishers, New York. P. 183.

[2] Flint, C. (2011). Introduction to geopolitics. London :Rout ledge

[3] Jones et. al.(2011). an Introduction to Political Geography: Space, Place and Politics.

[4] ibid

[5] ibid

[6] ibid

[7] ibid

[8] ibid

[9] Harold, M. (1975). The life and times of Menelik II Ethiopia 1844-1913. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

[10] Mburu, N. (2003). Delimitation of elastic ilemi triangle. Pastrol conflict and official indifference in the horn of africa. frican Studies Quarterly, The Online Journal for African Studies, Spring

[11] ibid

[12] Mburu, N. (2003). Delimitation of elastic ilemi triangle. Pastrol conflict and official indifference in the horn of afrikca. frican Studies Quarterly, The Online Journal for African Studies, Spring

[13] ibid

[14] Mburu, N. (2003). Delimitation of elastic ilemi triangle. Pastrol conflict and official indifference in the horn of afrikca. frican Studies Quarterly, The Online Journal for African Studies, Spring

[15] ibid

[16] ibid

[17] ‘Kenya-Abyssinia border 1932-33’

[18]Farah, T (1976). The problem of the Baro Salient. Sudan notes and records. LVII, 21-30.

[19] Mburu, N. (2003). Delimitation of elastic ilemi triangle. Pastrol conflict and official indifference in the horn of afrikca. frican Studies Quarterly, The Online Journal for African Studies, Spring

[20] ibid

[21] Martin, J. (2011). The Elemi triangle history. Nairobi: Opinion Kenya Ltd.

[22] Mburu, N. (2003). Delimitation of elastic ilemi triangle. Pastrol conflict and official indifference in the horn of afrikca. frican Studies Quarterly, The Online Journal for African Studies, Spring

[23]Collins, R. (2004).The ilemi triangle California :University of California Santa Barbara.

[24] Mwaura, P. (2005). Kenya’s claim over Sudan, Ethiopia border triangle precarious. Khartoum: Sudan tribute.

[25]Olaka, H.( 2010).Economic Implications of the Oil Discovery in Kenya. Nairobi: The Centre for Research on Financial Markets and Policy

[26] ibid

[27] Kinyanjui, B (2012). Kenya strikes oil in Turkana County but drilling could take years. Daily Nation

[28]ibid

[29]Government of the Republic of South Sudan. (2011-2013). South Sudan Development Plan2011-2013. Juba: GoSS.

[30]World Bank Report 2013.

[31] ibid

[32]http://www.southsudaninfo.com/Lamu-Southern_Sudan-Ethiopia_Transport_Corridor_Project.

[33]Sophie,H. & Max, H. (2013). South Sudan. London: Bradt Travel Guides.

[34] ibid

[35]ibid

[36]Mburu.

[37] Borders M. (2010) The Ilemi Triangle Sovereignty scape.

[38]Robert O. Collins O. R (2004)The Ilemi Triangle University of California Santa Barbara

[39] Amutabi and Were, 2000

[40] Cohens (1973, p. 85).

[41]Silberfein M. (2004) The Geopolitics of Conflict and Diamonds in Sierra Leone, Frank Cass and Company Limited.

[42]The Carter Center (2010) Approaches to Solving Territorial Conflicts: Sources, Situations, Scenarios, and Suggestions, One Copen hill, Atlanta, GA.

[43]East Africa Energy (2012) Territorial disputes in Eastern Africa: The Mineral factor http://eafricaenergy.blogspot.com/2012/10/territorial-disputes-in-eastern-africa.html. Accessed on 20 April 2015.

[44] Attilio,A.(2006).Geo-political explanation of conflict in the Horn of Africa.Addis Ababa:.OSSREA.

[45] MoF. (2009). Foreign policy framework .Nairobi: GoK.

[46] Peter, M. (2005). Kenya’s claim over Sudan, Ethiopia border triangle precarious.Nairobi: Daily Nation.

[47] ibid

[48] http://www.goss.org/

[49] Sam, K. (2012). The Ilemi triangle –a beacon of peace turned into a cause of conflict. Nairobi: word press.

[50] MoF. (2014). International relations: the principals of Ethiopia’s foreign policy. Addis Ababa: Government of Ethiopia.

[51] Siefulaziz, M. (2004). Baseline study for the Ethiopian side of the karamoja cluster. Addis Ababa: National Inistitute Research for Ethiopia

[52] Collins, R. (2010). The ilemi triangle. Santa Barbara :University of California.

[53] ibid

[54] Ibid

File

1.4.01.pdf

Version

Vol. 1 No. 5 July, 2016

Author

Edward Waithaka and Patrick Maluki

Resolving Conflicts using Indigenous Institutions: A Case Study of NJURI-NCHEKE of Ameru, Kenya

ijsac — Sat, 16 Jul 2016 06:02:23 +0000

Resolving Conflicts using Indigenous Institutions: A Case Study of NJURI-NCHEKE of Ameru, Kenya ijsac Sat, 07/16/2016 - 12:02

DR. KIREMA NKANATA MBURUGU and Prof. DAVID MACHARIA

ABSTRACT

The history of conflict is as old as human history. From the dawn of human history, communities have been competing for control of resources and for dominance. These competitions inevitably led individuals as well as social, political, economic, and religious groups to conflicts. It is true that conflict has devastating effects and it is unwanted. It is also true that conflict is unavoidable and it continuous to occur. Conflict is a natural phenomenon in human society except that the approach to its perceptiveness, nature and management vary from society to society. Even the patterns and phases of conflict vary from community to community. Since the causes of conflict are different, it would be better to use different mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of conflicts. This study sought to assess the role of indigenous institutions in promoting sustainable peace in Kenya. The study aimed at exploring the methods used by indigenous institutions in conflict resolution, their achievements, constraints and how to strengthen their role in promoting sustainable peace in the country. A case study of Njuri Ncheke Council of elders of Ameru was taken. The Council has its headquarters at Nchiru market about 13 kilometres from Meru Town. Njuri Ncheke has a membership of approximately five thousand elders who are spread in the current two Meru counties, that is Meru and Tharaka/Nithi counties. Johan Galtung’s conflict theory and analysis that seeks to understand the root causes of conflicts, structure and dynamics of conflicts and its actors with an aim of suggesting possible resolution strategies was used. It reflects the general theory that violence is inevitable and the aim of peace action should therefore be preventing, managing, limiting and overcoming violence. The study used descriptive survey design and research instruments used were questionnaires and interview schedule. Descriptive statistics were used to present the findings of the study. The study revealed that Njuri-Ncheke is involved in conflict resolution and promotion of peace in Meru community. Most of the conflicts are resolved at Njuri-Ncheke houses with only intra Njuri-Ncheke disputes and appeals getting handled at Njuri-Ncheke headquarters. The conflict resolution methods used by Njuri-Ncheke council of elders included determination of cases, oathing, counseling, peace crusades, dialogue and instilling discipline among community members.

Keywords: Conflict, indigenous institutions, sustainable peace

INTRODUCTION

Achievement of sustainable peace is one of the greatest concerns of all countries. In pre-colonial Africa, this was achieved through the use of indigenous institutions. Indigenous conflict resolution in Africa had spectacular feature uncommon in the global space. The notable feature of this conflict resolution stood Africans in the vintage position of demonstrating their culture and according it a radiant splendor and flame. This was why in pre- colonial African societies, peace and harmony somehow reigned supreme and often produced unique atmosphere for peace to thrive and development became dynamic. Indigenous mechanisms are time tested and effective to handle conflicts that arise. For example, in the Horn of African region, had it not been for these mechanisms, the now sporadic conflict in the area would have been exacerbated and gone out of the governments’ control thus escalating to full scale of war between the neighboring states.

When compared with the non-indigenous ones, indigenous mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of conflicts are less complex, save time, and give a chance to parties in conflict to actively participate to solve their own problems and to handle their affairs in a relatively more acceptable way to them (Olaoba et al 2010). The features of indigenous conflict resolution in African societies included performance stance; resolvability of conflict due to the adopted methods and mechanisms demonstration of the customs and norms; deification of the ethnical framework of the society; and the trust of conflict resolution mechanisms that were widespread throughout the society: all these leading to the creation of conducive environment for the facilitation of peace and the enhancement of harmony within and between neighbouring communities. In other words, these mechanisms were restorative thus leading to healing for communities that had no choice but to live together or next to one another.

The Meru community in Eastern Province, Kenya has an indigenous institution known as Njuri-Ncheke. Njuri-Ncheke means ‘the thinned out’ or selected committee with a definite social role. It is a traditional governing council for the entire Meru Community which is made up of seven sub-groups: Igembe, Tigania, Imenti, Tharaka, Mwimbi, Muthambi and Chuka (Ishinda et al, 2008). Oral traditions and literature are collaborative in pointing out that Njuri Ncheke was initially formed when the Ameru arrived in their present land from Mbwaa, on the eastern coast of Kenya. According to Ishinda et al, (2008), the chief architect or founder–father of Njuri Ncheke, was Kaura-O-Bachau (Kaura son of Bachau). Before he died, Kaura-O-Bachau made a vow, a binding curse that the Njuri Ncheke shall never die or cease to exist in Meru. Generally in many traditional communities, breaking such a curse is considered a bad omen and it explains why the Njuri Ncheke has continued to thrive so as to avoid curse from God or the wrath of the ancestors.

The name of Njuri Ncheke is derived from the ritual oath that was taken by all the members of the traditional council: however, only the elders (judges) of the court know this sacred and secret oath (Rimita 1988). The council has three ranks: the lowest being the Njuri comprised of general elders; the second rank is the Njuri Ncheke, a ruling committee; while the third is the supreme authority, the Njuri Mpingere. Members of the Njuri are selected elders who have passed through a series of special initiation rites and paid the established fees. For all practical purposes, the choice of an elder for Njuri membership depends entirely on the inviting members. The choice generally falls on elders who have distinguished themselves by their brilliance and their wealth. And as Kinyua (1970) would say, despite the fact that one could find a poor man in Njuri-Ncheke, it was impossible to find a wealthy fool in it.

According to M’Imanyara (1992), Njuri Ncheke was the institution whose responsibility was to make laws, issue state orders as well as decrees affecting the entire Meru society. Njuri Ncheke acted as the judiciary and also enforced the rules and regulations aimed at conserving the environment. Njuri Ncheke continues to operate in the Meru community and plays various roles in conflict resolution and maintenance of peace not only within the Meru community but also with its neighbours. On this latter account, for example, the Standard newspaper (27/4/2009) reported that Njuri-Ncheke was reaching out to their colleagues from other communities to unite President Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga, the two political rivals who had been persuaded to form the Grand Coalition government after the 2007/08 ethnic crashes in Kenya. The Njuri-Ncheke and Luo Council of Elders were reported to be consulting to facilitate a national elders meeting to discuss the crisis in the Grand Coalition government. This indicates that indigenous institutions can play a key role in reconciliation and promoting sustainable peace in Kenya.

Statement of Problem

The now quite regular intra and inter-ethnic conflicts in Kenya is an issue of great concern both locally and internationally. Trends such as the 2007/2008 post-election violence; the formation of youth militia groups in several communities; some fairly large scale ethnic clashes such as in the Tana River Delta and along the borders with Ethiopia and Somalia; and also incessant family disputes, among others, indicate an increase in both conflicts and violence in the Kenyan society. Government mechanism in resolving these conflicts such the Judiciary, the Kenya Police Services and various other administrative systems at various levels, seem inadequate in addressing these conflicts and violence. This inability to solve local issues has resulted into other options that have included the International Criminal Court (ICC) and Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) being used as avenues of resolving conflicts. Not only are these expensive in terms of time and resources, but they are also “strange” to the local communities and their need for sustainable peace. It is against this background that indigenous institutions found in various ethnic communities since the pre-colonial period need to be incorporated in conflict resolution. To this end, the Kenya Chief Justice, Dr. Willy Mutunga, in a wide ranging interview by the Standard newspaper on 30^th March 2014, noted that only 5% of Kenyans utilised the modern judicial system. In encouraging the use of indigenous and other alternative conflict resolution mechanisms since these are incorporated in the 2010 Constitution of Kenya, (particularly Article 159c), he noted that the modern judicial system was “adversarial, expensive and destructive especially in family cases.”

However, the role of indigenous institutions in conflict resolution and promotion of sustainable peace need to be investigated with the view of strengthening them. This study looks at the indigenous institutions taking the Njuri Ncheke Council of Elders of Ameru community of Eastern Kenya as a case.

OBJECTIVES

This study is guided by following four objectives.

To assess the role played by Njuri Ncheke Council of Elders in conflict resolution in the Meru community.
To explore the achievement of Njuri Ncheke Council of Elders initiatives in maintaining peace in Meru.
To establish the challenges experienced by Njuri Ncheke Council of Elders in maintaining sustainable peace in Meru.
To establish ways of strengthening Njuri Ncheke Council of Elders in promoting sustainable peace in Meru.

Theoretical Framework

This study has been based on the framework of both Conflict Theory and Peace Theory as postulated by Johan Galtung, (1996). Galtung proposes a Conflict Triangle that is based on the assumption that the best way to define peace is to define violence, its antithesis. It reflects the general theory that, unlike conflict that is a human trait, violence is a human creation, something learnt, and hence it can be reversed. Education – all throughout human history – has played a role either in instigating violence or in curbing it. Accordingly, peace education and peace action should have two interrelated purposes: firstly, to help the individuals internalise peace, that is, they themselves be peaceful beings; and secondly, equip the individuals and their communities with the necessary tools for preventing, managing, limiting and overcoming such violence.

It is also necessary that in our modern world and especially as we closely examine the role of indigenous institutions in conflict resolution, that we also examine violence and conflict holistically. It is for this reason that the inclusive Johan Galtung’s conflict theory becomes relevant, especially his Conflict Triangle that is made up of direct, structural and cultural violence, as shown in the Figure 1.

Figure 1: Conflicts Triangle

Direct violence

Structural violence Cultural violence

Source: Galtung 1996

Direct violence refers to somatic or overt violence that harms the body and may include light actions such as a slap all the way killing and even massacre by a known agent that planned and the executed the action. Structural violence refers to indirect violence caused by imbedded unjust societal structures that result in inequality in distribution of resources and in resultant benefits. Such violence is manifested by negative effects caused by avoidable causes such as shortages even in plenty, deaths that can be easily avoided, and the like. All this must not be confused with the so-called “acts of God” that may include death or injuries from accidents, floods or hurricanes. It is however necessary to note that often many of such injuries arise from human negligence since most times humans are aware of such “acts” and are capable of avoiding the resultant disaster. Cultural violence occurs as a result of the cultural assumptions that blind one to both direct and structural violence. A key example of this in the Kenyan situation would be the cruel practice of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) that, though now illegal, continues to thrive as the involved communities consider the practice to be culturally significance much as it violates the girls’ health and dignity.

The study also exploits Galtung’s peace theory that explains two types of peace, namely, negative and positive peace. Galtung defines negative peace as the absence of direct or somatic violence whether directed to an individual or even to a whole community. However, such a definition is narrow as it ignores the presence of the other two forms of violence, that is, structural and cultural violence mainly due to their being systemic, that is, their hidden nature in the fabric of society. Under such circumstances, totally unacceptable societal behaviour patterns that are certainly inconsistent with peace become accepted as peaceful. It is for such consideration that Galtung advocates positive peace, includes not only absence of direct, but also that of structural and cultural violence. The absence of structural violence is a positively defined condition that amounts to the egalitarian distribution of power and resources in society, whose implementation would automatically lead to the reduction or elimination of personal or direct violence and thus ensuring that hostility and further violence could no longer flourish. The theory proposes a holistic view of peace far beyond the absence of war, that is, absence of direct violence, to also include peace as justice and development, that is, absence of structural violence. It also advocates viewing peace as respect and tolerance between people, peace as balance in and within ecosystem, inner peace or spiritual peace, that is, peace with one’s God and with self and peace as wholesome or making whole, that is, a feeling of total satisfaction with life and anything around one.

The conflict and peace theory have therefore enabled this study to explain the meaning of sustainable peace, namely presence of positive peace in the community. Noting that Njuri Ncheke is basically a culturally based organization, the study was concerned in assessing the role of the Council in handling violence, especially structural and cultural violence within the Meru community.

METHODOLOGY

A cross sectional descriptive survey was employed to investigate the role of indigenous institutions in resolving conflicts in Kenya. The major purpose of descriptive survey is presentation of the state of affairs as it exists at present. The target population was members of Njuri Ncheke Council of Elders of Ameru. Meru is currently divided into twelve districts namely, Igembe North, Igembe South, Tigania East, Tigania West, Imenti North, Buuri, Meru Central, Imenti South, Nithi, Maara, Tharaka South and Tharaka Nrorth. Owing to the indigenous nature of the Njuri Ncheke, it was difficult to establish its total membership as no register is kept. However, according to information from Njuri Ncheke National General Secretary, Mr. Phares Rutere, and Spiritual Leader, Rev. Stephen Mugambi Mwithimbu, it was estimated to have about five thousand members (5000). A census of Njuri Ncheke officials was taken as shown in the Table 1 .

Table 1: Sampling Frame

Category	No. of members	Sample	Percentage
Nyambene Region Officials	40	40	100
Imenti Region Officials	30	30	100
National Officials	15	15	100
Total	85	85	100

FINDINGS

The role of Njuri Ncheke Council of Elders in Conflict Resolution

The central role of Njuri Ncheke in conflict resolution and promotion of peace were realized from the study. The study established that the Council’s effectiveness sprung especially from two of its positive features namely, its structure and also the wide-ranging strategies employed to resolve conflict as it occurs. Njuri Ncheke structure starts from the location committees all the way to the National Executive Council which is the supreme organ. The lower level organs form what is known as the Njuri Ncheke Houses, found in every district while the Njuri Ncheke headquarters and shrine are located at Nchiru Market, thirteen kilometers from Meru Town.

Table 2 records the places where disputes are resolved.

Table 2. Places where disputes are handled

Place		Frequency	Percentage
	Njuri Ncheke Houses	50	62.5
	Njuri Ncheke Headquarters	20	25.0
	Places where disputes occur (homes, etc.)	10	12.5
Total		80	100.0

As Table 2 reveals, most of the conflicts, constituting 62.5% are resolved at Njuri Ncheke Houses that are found all over the community and another 12.5% concerning minor dispute such as found in homes or concerning boundaries are resolved basically where they occur. It is only intra-Njuri Ncheke disputes, appeals and cases involving the entire Meru community, comprising only 18.8% which get handled at Njuri Ncheke headquarters. The study established that the community admires this decentralization strategy of conflict resolution as it makes conflict resolution easier and manageable. It also emerged from the study that Njuri Ncheke upheld principles of justice in resolving disputes by making its courts open to members of the public, allowing parties involved in a dispute to tell their story, call witnesses and those who wish can get represented by a third party.

These findings are supported by M’Imanyara (1991) that administration of justice was the main pre-occupation of elders. At any court sitting, experts in legal proceedings were invited from other Houses of the Council to act as assessors. The judicial system was so good that it allowed the plaintiff and the defendant to invite their own trustees in court who, in most cases, were themselves very knowledgeable in legal practice. According to Kangoi (1972), the decisions of Njuri Ncheke were final. There was no other authority to which an appeal of cases could be made. As such then, and as Rimita (1988) would state, all Njuri Ncheke judgments had to be absolutely right if the Njuri Ncheke elders could help it.

Other Mechanisms for Conflict Resolution

Njuri Ncheke also employs other community-respected mechanisms of resolving disputes and maintaining peace, apart from listening to cases, as shown in Table 3.

Table 3. Other Mechanisms Used in Resolving Conflicts

Methods	Frequency	Percentage
Advice/counseling	70	87.50
Oathing	45	56.25
Peace crusades	52	65.0
Instilling discipline	60	75.0
Cursing	25	31.25
Dialogue	74	92.50
Negotiation	63	78.75

N = 80

As indicated in Table 3, these are wide-ranging mechanisms of conflict resolution that are employed by Njuri Ncheke council of elders depending on particular circumstances. The key attraction of all of them is their participatory nature that inevitably leads to restoration of whatever relationship that had been broken or injured. Besides, the open nature of the proceedings provides a learning opportunity for all present to avoid a repeat in the future.

Cooperation with other Conflict Resolution Bodies

The study also revealed an exciting development in that co-operation existed between the judicially arm of government and Njuri Ncheke in conflict resolution. For example, the respondents quoted instances where the judicially referred cases to the Council to investigate and report their finds back to court. Such cases particularly involve un-adjudicated land disputes, family disputes and boundary disputes.

Achievements of Njuri Ncheke in conflicts resolution

As far as conflict resolution among the Ameru was concerned, Njuri Ncheke has many other positive aspects as outlined in Table 4.

Table 4: Achievements of Njuri Ncheke in resolving disputes

Achievement	Frequency	Percentage
Corruption free	68	85.0
Handle case quickly	71	88.75
Reasonable fees (cheap)	63	78.75
Abolition of negative cultural practices	40	50.0
Social moderation	51	63.75
Maintenance of discipline	57	71.25

N = 80

As shown in Table 4, the study established that Njuri Ncheke has been able to expedite dispute resolution without delay and through a corruption-free process. Also, and as contrasted with the formal judicial systems, Njuri Ncheke offers legal service at affordable costs thus making its services accessible to many; with the destitute, orphans and widowers accessing such legal service from Njuri Ncheke for free.

Another achievement cited by the respondents was that Njuri Ncheke promotes peace in the community through maintenance of discipline among the community members. Those who contravene Njuri Ncheke discipline code are punished. It was also established that Njuri Ncheke provides social moderation and respect for social values which are vital in promotion of peace within the community, including giving guidance on various social aspects such as marriage, dowry payment and inheritance so as to help avoid conflicting cultural practices.

These findings resonate with Ishida et al (2007) who report that the Njuri Ncheke of Meru has managed to preserve its social significance with regard to disputed management at the grassroots level. In Meru communities today, it is fairly common for the local people to result to traditional methods, especially when they find it hard to determine their disputes through tête-à-tête talks between the parties themselves or in informal litigation at official courts or out-of-court mediation at a chief’s baraza (meeting). In such cases, the parties visit the neighbourhood forum of Njuri Ncheke in which traditional oaths can be taken as an alternative method of dispute settlement. In both criminal and civil cases, once the defendants swear with regard to the matter of dispute, they are released from the burden of proof, whereas the complainants are required to wait for the outcomes of the oath (Ishida et al, 2007). Some of the cases dealt with by these Njuri Ncheke Houses include boundary disputes, personal debts and petty theft cases. Njuri Ncheke National Council still meets at its headquarters in Nchiru and settles major disputes especially boundary disputes between various Meru sub-tribes.

The study also concurs with M’Imanyara (1992) that Njuri Ncheke was the Ameru’s institution whose responsibility was to make laws and issue state orders as well as decrees affecting the entire Meru community. As the delegates to Njuri Ncheke national assembly are representatives of every House of Njuri Ncheke and are also “Merus’ wisest” – not just then, but also now – it would be unusual if their decisions were not generally accepted. Besides, Njuri Ncheke has also endeared itself to its society by offering leadership that has greatly reduced negative cultural practices such as Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) and cattle rustling that are currently key causes of conflict in society, not only in Meru but elsewhere. Moreover, and away from the expected cultural responsibilities, Njuri Ncheke has also spearhead development projects that benefit the entire Meru community. Perhaps the top case is the building of the Meru University of Science and Technology for which the Council has donated six hundred forty one acres of community land and is represented in the University Management Council.

Challenges Experienced by Njuri Ncheke in conflict resolution

Table 5 presents the challenges faced by Njuri Ncheke in its declared responsibility of conflict resolution among the Ameru community.

Table 5. Challenges experienced by Njuri Ncheke in resolving disputes

Challenge	Frequency	Percentage
Financial problems	71	88.75
Disregard by the youth and elite	60	75.0
Hostility from some religious groups	30	37.5
Political interference	69	86.25
Lack of legal mandate	65	81.25
Lack of commitment by some leaders and members	21	26.25

N=80

As shown in Table 5, Njuri Ncheke faces a number of key challenges, firstly, as an institution and secondly in its efforts at conflict resolution and in promotion of peace among its constituent population. The study established financial problems as the main challenge experienced by the Council and its Houses. This is so because Njuri Ncheke has only registration fee for new members and the very low legal fees that are charged to those seeking its services as the sources of its income. Political interference, especially from the community power elites as they compete for influence of the Meru community, is another challenge to the Council especially as this goes against the Council’s mandate of uniting the community. Njuri Ncheke also lacks the legal mandate for its peace promotion activities as the institution is not registered. It therefore has no legal backing in resolving disputes and its resolutions are not enforceable. Other challenges include disregard of Njuri Ncheke by the youth and elite in the community who, in spite of indications otherwise, still consider the institution as “primitive” and out of step with modern ways of operation. Hostility from some religious groups and lack of commitment by some of community leaders and members are also identified as challenges. These findings are in line with other studies of traditional institutions. According to Rimita (1988), the indigenous institutions experience challenge from the state-based institutions such as the judiciary and the police department who, especially in criminal cases, over-rule the decisions or rulings by traditional institutions.

Another major challenge of most indigenous institutions is the exclusion of women from policy and decision making, thereby excluding about half the adult population. For example, Njuri Ncheke is a men only Council (Rimita, 1988). The exclusion of youth and also the shying away of the educated and westernized elites, especially where traditional institutions have remained glued to the past, forms another great challenge. Indigenous institutions also experience challenge from modernization and monetization which are destroying communal spirit by encouraging individualism (Olowu and Eero). For example, unlike the past when elders were giving voluntary service to the community, today people tend to demand payment for any service that they offer.

Another challenge is that most cases conducted by indigenous institutions, including the Njuru Ncheke, are generally held in open air grounds. While we have hailed this “openness” and inclusion of all as positive, some parties, especially during cases of property ownership and inheritance rights, shy away from talking freely in the presence of large gatherings (Njuri Ncheke Report 1994 ).

Strengthening of the roles of Njuri Ncheke

In order to perform its duties of conflict resolution and peace building with confidence and to the satisfaction of its clientele and also within the national legal provisions, it is necessary to strengthen Njuri Ncheke and is organs. Table 6 records suggestions from the study on this aspect.

Table 6. Suggestions on Strengthening of Njuri Ncheke Council of Elders

Suggestions	Frequency	Percentage
Give it constitutional recognition	73	91.25
Government funding	60	75
Offering legal education	45	56.25
Involvement in income generation activities	51	63.75
Networking with other institutions	61	76.25
Preservation of indigenous knowledge	20	25
Detaching politics from the affairs of the institution	67	83.75

N=80

As is clear from Table 6, majority of the respondents felt that there is need for constitutional recognition of Njuri Ncheke together with other indigenous institutions in the country. In fact, such recognition is already provided for in the 2010 Constitution of Kenya under Article 44 on Language and Culture, but more particularly in Article 159c on Judicial Authority. The only qualification is that such indigenous mechanisms are within the general provisions of the constitution. It is therefore a question of finding the right mechanisms of operationalising these

constitutional provisions to avoid the present quite regular overruling of some Njuri Ncheke judgments because they lack legal mandate to resolve disputes. Njuri Ncheke also operates under difficult financial constraints due to lack of income generating activities. The study established that government funding and involvement of Njuri Ncheke in income generating activities would strengthen its activities by solving the challenge of financial constraints. There is also the need for the provision of legal education and training to Njuri Ncheke so as to equip the leadership and the members with dispute resolution skills.

The other strategies of strengthening the institution include networking with other indigenous institution and detaching politics from the affairs of the institution. The European Union-funded Baseline Survey, (Nov. 2004) in Turkana and Karamoja recommended peace dialogues to be facilitated and promoted and, where necessary, the government should aid the elders to enforce their resolutions. This also entails sensitizing the communities on the need to resolve their disputes amicably through dialogue and not through violence.

Quam (1996), recommends that there is need for the government to strengthen traditional institutions in building peace committees. These committees should be trained on modern arbitration, mediation, dialogue and democratic governance issues in order to enable them take cognizance of the modernizing world. Members of the peace committees should be facilitated to visit other areas that have mainstreamed the said issues. Ruto et al (2004), recommends that security linkages, collaboration and sharing of intelligence information between government and indigenous institution should be initiated and fostered. The institutions should be seen as complementing the work of the respective governments in building peace. Community policing should be promoted and strengthened in all areas.

Indigenous institution should be encouraged to embrace modern forms of education as a valued goal for its members. As already recorded, the Njuri Ncheke has led from the front by donating land and building the Meru University College of Science and Technology. We have other useful examples worth recording. In Ohafia community of Nigeria, children are encouraged to do well in school and their kin invest a large percentage of their scarce financial resources to send a promising student to college abroad. People do not consider this enthusiasm for education to be an indication of westernization. On the contrary, it is considered to be evidence of a continuing ethic of achievements which is said to have characterized the Ohafia people from time immemorial. The traditional quality of the achievement is captured in the celebration given to men who return home having completed advanced degrees. They are received to a performance of music, dance and singing which is identical to that performed a century ago for warriors returning successfully from battle. Thus the attainment of status signified by a university degree is made meaningful and characteristic of traditional values by being linked, ceremonially and symbolically, to the achievement of ancestors long ago (O’Meara and Martin 1995).

CONCLUSION

Based on the findings of the study, it can be concluded that Njuri Ncheke Council of Elders of Ameru plays a significant role in conflict resolution among its members and neighboring communities. Its role in this regard is a useful supplement to the judiciary and other related national organs in resolving conflicts at the local level especially on land, family and inter-community boundary disputes. The clients prefer to use the Council since the disputes brought to it are resolved cheaply, faster and to the satisfaction of the disputing parties and thus promoting restorative justice that ensures sustainable peace among the involved parties. However, Njuri Njekes’s effectiveness is compromised by the difficult circumstances under which it operates that included lack of recognition by the law, politicization of its activities by some key members that leads to divisions within the community, and also limited financial resources on which to operate.

It is for these reasons that the study recommends recognition and institutionalization of indigenous institutions like Njuri Ncheke as the law provides and also financial support and training in legal and conflict resolution matters by the government and other interested bodies. Such support would also ensure Njuri Ncheke’s effectiveness through rejection of political interference and manipulation and also its ability to take decision that are legally respectable, thus earning respect from all its clients and members. It is also necessary that the government provides guidelines on how the judiciary can work in collaboration with the Councils of Elders all over the land. This is so because these institutions have invaluable information that can be used to resolve many disputes now handled by the judiciary, an act that would lead to decongesting the law courts and making justice accessible at all levels of the society.

The study has also established need for Njuri Ncheke Council of Elders to network with other institutions that endeavor to promote peace in the country. These could include, among others, both local and international Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) that have objectives and activities of promoting peace in the society. Networking between and among the very few indigenous institutions that exist in the country should be encouraged so as to share knowledge and develop teamwork in promoting peace in the country. This should be through organizing annual elders’ conferences that could bring together all indigenous institutions into a discussion and strategizing on how to promote peace and dialogue in the country. Generally, and due to their inbuilt comprehension of local issues, indigenous institutions need to be more empowered through training in peace education all the way from training in early warning mechanism of conflict to resolving conflicts at hand.

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